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Introduction  
 
Given the consistency of terror attacks around the world, the slow defeat of Daesh, and 
the growth of domestic anti-terror policies, how do we deal with those who have carried out 
                                                 
1 Corresponding Author Contact: Tom Pettinger, Email: t.pettinger@warwick.ac.uk, Postal Address: Department 
of Politics and International Studies, Social Sciences Building, Warwick University, Coventry, CV4 7AL 
Abstract 
This article debates the justifications behind the practice of counter-radicalization and 
de-radicalization. It emphasizes the concepts as shrouded in confusion, and highlights 
that the practices continue to develop and expand despite claims of counter-
productiveness, wholly subjective evaluation, and significant doubt around their 
premises. The aim of this article is to encourage a greater awareness of the potential 
costs to society of promoting policy with no rigorous basis of evidence. Focussing on 
both (rehabilitative) prison counter-radicalization schemes and (preventative) non-
prison based de-radicalization, the discussion explores the evaluative methods that 
remain chaotic despite a growing need for ‘evidence-based’ public policy-making, 
examines the tenuous link between terrorism and ideology which upholds the 
principles behind attempts to combat radicalization, and then analyses the possible 
outcomes for society of relying on these schemes to minimize extremist violence. It 
concludes that taking the link between terrorism and ideology as causal is deeply 
flawed, and that by persisting with no systematic method of evaluation combating 
radicalization in these ways will continue to fail. Indeed, in prisons, they have been 
found to be distrusted, ineffective and even detrimental. Outside of prisons, where 
preventative counter-radicalization programmes exist, these will continue to divide 
societies among the lines where suspect communities are drawn. It takes the view that 
whilst we continue to elevate de-radicalization as a ‘useful tool’ in combating 
terrorism, we will also continue to associate certain people groups with terrorism and 
only add to grievances that exist in our societies. 
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violent extremism, and how do we protect our societies from further atrocities whilst treating 
them justly? This discussion examines the use of, and the power exerted by what are known 
as de-radicalization and counter-radicalization programmes that have developed over the last 
two decades. Accused of rarely focussing on actually practising de-radicalization,2 and with 
expert Daniel Koehler accepting that “the fail rate is great,”3 such programmes are beset by 
problems of definition, objective, evaluation, manipulation and discrimination. A ‘cottage 
industry’ is being established; money being poured in to counter the perceived threats has 
ensured the arrival of hosts of inexperienced practitioners.4 However, these schemes are also 
said to be an “essential tool to combat terrorist and extremist threats.”5 How useful are they in 
delivering results, are they built on rational conceptions of risk, and what are the 
consequences for society? As chronic confusion over the language exists, the following 
discussion firstly explores the definitions of important terms. The paper then moves on to 
exploring the value of de-radicalization and counter-radicalization as public policy, and how 
they are informed and measured. It then moves on to examining the consequences on society, 
and finally shows how these anti-terror policies could be differently approached. 
This paper establishes a distinction between Muslim-majority states which employ 
largely post-crime rehabilitation practices to deal with often low-level militants (but whose 
evaluative methods are dubious), and secular states that engage in preventative measures who 
involve themselves in the pre-crime space. Although not focussing solely on Britain for the 
preventative cases, the country’s approach is emphasized as a case study for its pervasiveness 
and growing influence (on Australia, the USA and Canada for example). The discussion 
                                                 
2 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2009), Addressing the 
Effectiveness of Current De-radicalization Initiatives and Identifying Implications for the Development of US-
Based Initiatives in Multiple Settings, 
https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/publications/local_attachments/De-
radicalization%20Programs%20Final%20Report.pdf, START, published Sept 2009, accessed 23/06/17 
3 Davis, M. (2016), De-radicalization Expert Finishes Testimony in ISIS Case, 
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/09/21/de-radicalization-expert-finishes-testimony-minnesota-isis-case, 
MPR News, published 21/09/16, accessed 27/04/17 
4 Zerofsky, E. (2016), The Growth of a De-radicalization Industry in France, 
http://pulitzercenter.org/projects/growth-de-radicalization-industry-france, Pulitzer Center, published 02/09/16, 
accessed 19/06/17 
5 Koehler, D. (2014), The Routledge International Handbook on Hate Crime (Routledge: London), pp. 420-9 
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challenges not only the notion that de-radicalization is practised with any consistency,6 but 
that its developing use may not successfully address the incidence of terrorism but instead 
enable its continuance, by focussing on countering ideologies that aren’t causally linked to 
extremist violence. It takes the view that practising de-radicalization and counter-
radicalization entrenches the idea that extremist violence is an individual-level phenomenon 
based on a warped ideology rather than encouraging rational discussions about risk.7 It 
concludes that the use of ‘de-radicalization’ as a term and in practice augments the belief and 
reality that certain groups are being profiled and further stigmatized. Such policies also 
discourage the ability to hold and discuss radical views within a society, with governments 
determining what acceptable religious and political views can be. Ultimately, the discussion 
suggests that we should reform the way we use the terms, and questioning their very validity 
as methods of securing ourselves against actual levels of threat. These policies remain flawed 
practice based on flawed theory, compounding discrimination against those at the fringes of 
our societies at the expense of considering rationally the level of risk we face. 
 
Definitions 
 
The term ‘de-radicalization’ has been consistently misused and misunderstood; it has, 
for example, been used to refer to community-based initiatives aimed at preventing 
engagement in radical violence, to policies effecting the demobilization and reintegration of 
insurgent groups, and to programmes aimed at counter-radicalization practices curtailing 
radical thoughts and utterances in those who have not engaged in violence. Despite emphatic 
calls for the different terms to be deployed with consideration and caution,8 even in literature 
considering the concepts explicitly the terms are often treated as one or are at least 
                                                 
6 Horgan, J., Braddock, K. (2010), ‘Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of 
De-radicalization Programmes’, in Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 22, pp. 267-91 
7 Schmid, A. (2013), Radicalization, Counterradicalization: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review, 
https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-
March-2013.pdf, International Centre for Counter-terrorism - The Hague, published March 2013, accessed 
23/06/17 
8 Koehler, D. (2014), loc. cit. 
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inadequately separated from one another.9 This section looks at the definitions of pertinent 
terms, including ideology, establishing a difference between preventative, pre-crime counter-
radicalization and schemes which rehabilitate individuals who have committed violent crimes 
ideologically. 
 
Ideology 
Targeting the radical ‘ideology’ held by individuals is the focus of programmes 
combating radicalization; ideology has been portrayed in discourse as a key motivating factor. 
This discussion takes the framing process theory in “understanding the character and course 
of social movements.”10 The theory suggests that ideology does play a role in individuals’ and 
groups’ movements towards political violence but it should not be thought of as a 
homogenous entity that motivates similarly across these individuals and groups. It should 
instead be seen and explained through ‘frames’, or stages of interaction of thought and 
articulation that influence an actor’s behaviour.11 Rather than just stating that ‘ideology’ 
mechanically causes terrorism, the theory proposes that the process of movement mobilization 
includes diagnostic framing (i.e. the identification of a problem and the defining of why a 
movement exists), prognostic framing (i.e. exploring what can be done to rectify the 
problem), and motivational framing (i.e. mobilizing affected individuals to join the cause and 
expanding the potential pool of recruits).12 The paper takes the view that ideologies are 
actively acquired by subjects, and are dynamic and “more complex than often presumed.”13 
David Snow and Scott Byrd write that it is fallacious to consider ideology as “tightly coupled, 
inelastic set of values, beliefs, and ideas”;14 within both individuals and movements the 
                                                 
9 See: El Said, H. (2015), New Approaches to Countering Terrorism: Designing and Evaluating Counter-
Radicalization and Dr-Radicalization Programs (Palgrave Macmillan: London), p. 21 
10 Snow, D., Benford, R. (2000), ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements’, in Annual Review of Sociology, 
Vol. 26, pp. 611-39 
11 Ibid. 
12 Snow, D., Byrd, S. (2000), ‘Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Movements’, in Mobilization: An 
International Quarterly Review, Vol. 12, Issue 1, pp. 119-36 
13 Snow, D. (2004), ‘Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields’, in eds. Snow, D., Soule, S., Kriesi, H., 
The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (Blackwell: Oxford), pp. 380-412 
14 Snow, D., Byrd, S. (2000), loc. cit. 
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ideologies are constantly changing depending on the circumstances and those engaging in 
framing. 
 
De-radicalization vs. Disengagement 
The notion of psychological reform for those who have committed acts of terrorism 
has consistently defined as de-radicalization, though far more frequently (even within 
academic literature) de-radicalization is confused with behavioural disengagement. For the 
purposes of this discussion, I will emphasize the difference between disengagement and de-
radicalization, taking disengagement as the group-based “physical cessation of some 
observable behaviour”15 in this context acts of terrorism, and taking Horgan’s definition of 
de-radicalization from his seminal 2009 work Walking Away from Terrorism as: 
“the social and psychological process whereby an individual’s commitment to, and 
involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at 
risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity”.16 
Daniel Koehler, the internationally renowned de-radicalization expert, contends that to ensure 
the minimization of recidivism, programmes should place “ideological reassessment as the 
basis of practical work”.17 In other words, he promotes the idea that the most effective method 
of countering the threat of extremism from subject participants is to walk them through 
ideological reform (or otherwise challenging the diagnostic framing element of the acquisition 
of an ideology), alongside more practical rehabilitation methods like skills training and social 
integration. The logic driving this perspective is that if purely mechanical behavioural change 
is achieved, the conditions for re-engagement in violence could easily occur. But if a subject 
was ideologically reformed through de-radicalization to a point where they “abandon the 
                                                 
15 Horgan, J., Braddock, K. (2010), loc. cit.; also see: Szmania, S., Mastreo, C. (2016), Surveying CVE Metrics in 
Prevention, Disengagement and De-radicalization Programmes, 
https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_SurveyingCVEMetrics_March2016.pdf, START, published Mar 2016, 
accessed 10/09/17 
16 Horgan, J. (2009b), Walking Away From Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist 
Movements (Routledge: London), p. 153 
17 Koehler, D. (2014), loc. cit. 
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radical worldview that justifies the use of violence”,18 then the likelihood of them turning to 
violence if the same conditions were present is far smaller. 
 
History 
The current wave of what are perceived or claimed to be de-radicalization programmes 
- which target ideology as a primary cause of terrorism - began in earnest when Yemen 
commenced its own initiatives, following al Qaeda attacks on US and French interests in the 
country. Fearing Western intervention after the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the Yemeni 
government felt it had to adjust from its failing and unpopular policy of hardline suppression 
of al Qaeda, to include ‘re-education’ of captured militants: the Yemeni Committee for 
Dialogue was born.19 The prisoners were challenged by the Religious Dialogue Committee 
(RDC, comprised of five religious scholars) on their views and beliefs. The RDC used the 
Quran to debate with them, “not on the content but on their understanding of the verses and 
hadiths”.20 Although it was discontinued by 2008 as a result of controversial decisions (like 
releasing some of the USS Cole attackers), the ideas developed in this programme were 
exported across the region, notably to Saudi Arabia, but also as far as Malaysia, Singapore, 
and Indonesia.21 Horgan argued that the Yemeni programme would “most closely resemble 
what one would expect of ‘de-radicalization’: a softening of views, an acceptance that the 
individual’s pursuit of his objectives using terrorism were illegitimate, immoral and 
unjustifiable”.22 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Rabasa, A. (2012), Angel M. Rabasa - De-radicalizing Islamist Extremists, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=24O5FjHG2AA, YouTube, hosted by RumiForum, published 26/04/12, 
accessed 11/06/17 
19 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2009), loc. cit. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Rabasa, A., Pettyjohn, S., Ghez, J., Boucek, C. (2010), De-radicalizing Islamist Extremists (RAND 
Corporation: California) 
22 Horgan, J. (2009), ‘De-radicalization or Disengagement? A Process in Need of Clarity and a Counter-terrorism 
Initiative in Need of Evaluation’, in International Journal of Psychology, Vol. 24, Issue 2, pp. 291-8 
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Pre-Crime Counter-radicalization and Post-Crime De-radicalization 
Programmes which deal with those who have not yet engaged in violent crimes are 
also often referred to as ‘de-radicalization’ schemes,23 although by taking Horgan’s definition 
of de-radicalization being a post-crime process, then dealing with pre-crime individuals 
holding radical views could be called ‘counter-radicalization’. Participants of these 
programmes can be those who possess a radical ideology, or those who are seen to be 
developing a radical ideology. Largely these take pre-crime schemes place outside of prisons, 
whereas de-radicalization mostly occurs with people actually convicted of crimes and in 
prisons. The effects of counter-radicalization and de-radicalization (with different levels of 
subjects’ criminality) are similar in curtailing the ability to hold radical views in a society, the 
Othering of groups of citizens, and so on, hence the parallel analysis of the two processes. 
There is a somewhat stark difference between what are known as ‘de-radicalization 
programmes’ that operate inside prisons, and those that operate outside. Schemes that target 
prisoners largely function to de-radicalize former militants, whilst those that target civilians in 
a pre-crime space function to prevent radicalization from occurring in the first place.24 Prison-
based de-radicalization programmes range from informal ‘chats’ between prisoners and 
imams (as in Victoria, Australia, until the Islamic Council of Victoria recently ended their 
partnership with the prison), to two-week intense ‘courses’ teaching prisoners basics of Islam 
(as in Mauritania), to years-long integrated programmes (as in Saudi Arabia). Most famously 
Saudi Arabia has engaged in constructing a comprehensive programme; alongside the 
ideological focus upon which it was first built, it now incorporates “political education, 
vocational training, painting, physical education and social and economic programs to 
facilitate reintegration of detainees”.25 It has even tried to find spouses for its prisoners when 
they are released.26 The Saudi scheme has been perceived somewhat as a model programme, 
                                                 
23 Koehler, D. (2017), Structural Quality Standards for Work to Intervene with and Counter Violent Extremism, 
http://www.kpebw.de/wp-content/uploads/Handbuch-KPEBW-engl.pdf, Counter Extremism Network 
Coordination Unit, published 2016, accessed 08/09/17 
24 Schmid, A. (2013), loc. cit. 
25 El Said, H. (2015), op. cit., p. 256 
26 Rabasa, A. (2012), loc. cit. 
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involving both ideological de-radicalization and continued disengagement through 
reintegrating them into their communities.27 Former militants are often used where possible in 
prison programmes to encourage the de-radicalization of subjects, and it runs classes on a 
wide range of areas to educate detainees, readying them for eventual rehabilitation.28 
Indonesia’s de-radicalization efforts include ensuring that captured Jemaah Islamiyah 
members spend time with a former commander, Bin Abbas, who challenges their justification 
for violence against civilians even before the police become involved with the process.29 
However, the Indonesian scheme is far less organized than the Saudi programme: Abuza 
remarks it remains “underfinanced, understaffed, and not terribly institutionalized”.30 At 
possibly the lowest level of institutionalization is the Australian de-radicalization initiative, in 
Victorian prison Goulburn, where imams came and chatted to inmates on an informal basis, 
and gave lectures on the basic tenets of Islam.31 The prison authorities are so uneducated on 
Islamic culture though, that “conversion is not only a cause for concern [for them], but is also 
taken as a sign of radicalization.”32 Another signifier of the lack of formality of the Victorian 
scheme was that instead of being allowed to talk in their mother tongue, the prison required 
that inmates’ visitation discussion took place in English, reinforcing “distrust between 
families and detained relatives on the one hand, and incarceration authorities on the other”.33 
Given differences in approach to the prison-based programme and dissatisfaction with other 
                                                 
27 Neumann, P. (2013), How Do Prison De-radicalization Programmes Work?, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T5WKyn6nQEs, YouTube, hosted by ICSR, published 09/12/13, accessed 
21/06/17 
28 al-Hadlaq, A. (2015), Saudi Efforts in Counter-Radicalisation and Extremist Rehabilitation, in eds. Gunaratna, 
R., Bin Ali, M., Terrorist Rehabilitation: A New Frontier in Counter-Terrorism (Imperial College Press: New 
Jersey), pp. 21-39 
29 Abuza, Z. (2009), ‘The Rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah Detainees in South East Asia: A Preliminary 
Assessment’, in eds. Bjørgo, T., Horgan, H., Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective 
Disengagement (Routledge: New York), pp. 193-211 
30 Ibid. 
31 El Said, H. (2015), op. cit., p. 29 
32 Ibid., p. 87 
33 Ibid., p. 84 
  
 
 
 
 
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization 
 
 
 
 
9 
forms of extremism not being treated in the same way as Islamist violence, the Islamic 
Council of Victoria in 2017 ended its role in the programme.34 
Outside of prison settings, counter-radicalization is practised even less systematically. 
Where Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian countries have tended to emphasize the counter-
radicalization of individual captured fighters who have engaged in illegality and violence, 
European efforts (with a couple of notable exceptions) have been aimed more at tackling 
radical beliefs and ‘ideologies’ before the threshold into physical violence and crime has been 
crossed. Although they are often called de-radicalization programmes,35 by Horgan’s 
definition these preventative schemes are not technically de-radicalization,36 nor are they 
disengagement as they intervene before crimes have been committed. Technically counter-
radicalization, they could be described as ‘risk prevention’ schemes (this point is discussed in 
more detail below). Efforts to keep individuals from engaging in radical violence are much 
more focussed on the prevention of radical ideologies and encourage the integration of ‘at-risk 
communities’ (which are primarily taken to be ‘Muslim communities’).37 Some genuine 
ideology-centred processing does occur outside of the prison setting, however: EXIT-
Germany requires that its subjects progress through a “successful challenge of the old 
ideology… An exit is successful when the fundamental ideologies and purposes of the 
previous actions have been resolved.”38 Voluntary, non-prison-based programmes mostly 
target those who have not yet committed crimes, but are those who the authorities consider at-
                                                 
34 Le Grand, C. (2017), Muslim Mentors Walk away from Jail De-radicalization Programme, 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/policy/muslim-mentors-walk-away-from-jail-deradicalisation-
program/news-story/9411aadf130f14ed39f0254975d53782, The Australian, published 09/06/17, accessed 
07/09/17 
35 Della Porta, D., LaFree, G. (2012), ‘Guest Editorial: Processes of Radicalization and De-radicalization’, in 
International Journal of Conflict and Violence, Vol. 6, issue 1, pp. 4-10 
36 For an introduction to the debate around radicalization, de-radicalization and definitions of related concepts, 
see: Demant, F., Slootman, M., Buijs, F., Tillie, J. (2008), Decline and Disengagement: An Analysis of Processes 
of De-radicalisation (Institute for Migration & Ethnic Studies: Amsterdam);  Schmid, A. (2013), loc. cit. 
37 Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2010), PPN Working Paper: De-radicalization, 
https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/115/channel-process, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 
published June 2010, accessed 15/06/17, p. 185 
38 European Commission (date unknown), EXIT-Germany, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7420_en, 
European Commission: Migration and Home Affairs, published unknown, accessed 20/06/17 
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risk of committing crimes.39 The Channel programme in the UK for instance (technically 
counter-radicalization) is known as a ‘de-radicalization’ programme40 despite extremist 
violence not having taken place, focusses on the ideology of those referred to it, who move 
through a series of interventions by officials. 
 
Value of De-radicalization and Counter-radicalization as Practice 
 
The main arguments put forward in support of combating ideological radicalization 
(often alongside more mechanical disengagement) are that it reduces recidivism from former 
militants more assuredly in the long-run and, where no crimes have been committed, it 
reduces the risk of individuals engaging in violence in the first place. Overall its proponents 
claim that, where successful, combating ideological radicalization is “more enduring, resilient 
and immune from recidivism”41 than schemes where ideology is not challenged and reformed. 
Hamed El Said suggests that de-radicalization programmes save significant sums of public 
money, because “‘wining hearts and minds’ is less [financially] costly than waging wars”,42 
and consequentially anger at the country’s foreign policy is limited, meaning fewer 
individuals see turning to violence as legitimate. The programmes are also praised, where they 
accompany rehabilitative practices, for working with friends and families of the individuals 
on their return to normal life, to ensure that the supporting contacts are vigilant against 
“radicalization and recruitment”,43 such as is the practice in Saudi Arabia. De-radicalization 
of the individuals can also be supported by families; in Kuwait, Guantanamo Bay returnees 
remarked that their families could help to persuade them to abandon violent extremism.44 This 
section explores and criticizes the value of de-radicalization against its own claims of success 
and internal justifications. 
                                                 
39 Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2010), op. cit., pp. xx-xxi 
40 BBC (2015), De-radicalization Programme Referrals on the Rise, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34469331, 
BBC, published 08/10/15, accessed 19/06/17 
41 El Said, H. (2015), op. cit., p. 7 
42 Ibid., p. 263 
43 Porges, M., Stern, J. (2010), Getting De-radicalization Right, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/persian-
gulf/2010-05-01/getting-de-radicalization-right, Foreign Affairs, published 2010, accessed 19/06/17 
44 El Said, H. (2015), op. cit., p. 37 
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Measures of Evaluation 
The principle justification though for developing and expanding such schemes is that 
they are claimed to ‘work’. Though there is debate about the ideal outcomes of de-
radicalization, rates of recidivism are understood to be legitimate markers of a programme’s 
success, and indeed, they are consistently referred to when discussing the effectiveness of 
programmes and initiatives.45 Sometimes startlingly and “suspiciously”46 low rates of 
recidivism are reported by programme administrators; German right-wing extremism 
programme EXIT-Germany, which focusses explicitly on countering the subject’s extremist 
ideology, boasts a 3% recidivism rate over 500 cases, for instance.47 For several years Saudi 
Arabia remarkably claimed its scheme resulted in 0% recidivism,48 and the Mauritanian 
programme led to only 1 arrest from 37 cases of ‘de-radicalization’.49 Claims of 
overwhelming success, like these, are not uncommon.50 
However, the stats produced are arguably misleading for a number of reasons. Often 
the results are misreported: Saudi Arabia moved its estimate from zero to 5-7% of the 
participants of its comprehensive (de-radicalization and reintegration) programme being re-
arrested,51 later made an admission that actually 10-20% recidivism was more accurate,52 but 
the director of the University of St. Mary’s Center for Terrorism Lt. Col. Jeff Addicott states 
the figure is more likely to be nearer 30-40%.53 Furthermore, the Saudi Security 
Subcommittee places “tight restrictions on what [programme participants] may do and with 
                                                 
45 Koehler, D. (2017), Understanding De-radicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering Violent 
Extremism (Routledge: New York), p. 172  
46 Horgan, J., Braddock, K. (2010), loc. cit. 
47 EXIT-Deutschland (date unknown), EXIT-Germany: We Provide Ways out of Extremism, http://www.exit-
deutschland.de/english, EXIT-Deutschland, published unknown, accessed 22/06/17 
48 Koehler, D. (2014), loc. cit. 
49 El Said, H. (2015), op. cit., p. 134 
50 Porges, M. (2010), The Saudi De-radicalization Experiment, https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/saudi-de-
radicalization-experiment, Council on Foreign Relations, published 22/01/10, accessed 21/06/17 
51 Gardner, F. (2008), Saudi Jails Aim to Tackle Terror, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7220797.stm, BBC, published 31/01/08, accessed 22/06/17 
52 Koehler, D. (2014), loc. cit. 
53 Lt. Col. Addicott, J., in Fox News (2010), More Guantanamo Detainees are Returning to Terror upon 
Release, http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/03/29/gitmo-detainees-return-terror.html, Fox News, published 
29/03/10, accessed 16/07/17 
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whom they may associate”54 even after they have ‘graduated’. Had these individuals been 
truly de-radicalized and really come to believe in the ideals of the state, they would not need 
such stringent governmental oversight. As well as the ‘spinning’ of actual data, Ferguson 
notes that recidivism rates amongst political terrorists can be consistently and significantly 
lower than ‘normal’ criminals, regardless of their participation in ideologically-based 
reformative programmes.55 More structurally, the real incidence of reoffending is hidden 
through different understandings of who the subjects of de-radicalization are. EXIT-Germany, 
for example, demonstrates a 2% reoffending rate, but the individuals subjected to the 
programme are in fact volunteers, and have contacted EXIT to help them leave the extremist 
groups they’ve been involved with.56 These individuals are actively looking to remove 
themselves from the groups, and can therefore be counted as ‘soft’ targets for de-
radicalization. This is not even accounting for ‘abortions’, or those who don’t make it through 
the programme.57 Other programmes’ alleged low level of recidivism should also be 
questioned; El Said notes in his study examining de-radicalization and disengagement 
programmes that “the most radical [individuals in the Mauritanian programme]… refused 
even to participate in the dialogue process.”58 Had the scheme represented all of the militants, 
the rate of recidivism may have been far higher than that which was reported. Similarly, 
despite relatively low levels of reported recidivism in the reputed Saudi Arabian programme, 
its de-radicalizing efforts are focussed not explicitly on violent extremists, but lower-level 
supporters who “are said not to have blood on their hands.”59 The Institution for Strategic 
Dialogue comments that it directs its efforts towards 
                                                 
54 Braddock, K. (2013), ‘The Talking Cure: Communication and Psychological Impact in Prison De-
radicalization Programmes’, in ed. Silke, A., Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, 
Radicalization and Reform (Routledge: London), pp. 60-74 
55 Ferguson, N. (2016), ‘Disengaging from Terrorism: A Northern Irish Experience’, in Journal for De-
radicalization, Vol. 6, Spring Issue, pp. 1-29 
56 European Commission (date unknown), EXIT-Germany, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7420_en, 
European Commission: Migration and Home Affairs, published unknown, accessed 20/06/17 
57 Koehler, D. (2017), op. cit., p. 172-4 
58 El Said, H. (2015), op. cit., p. 134 
59 Rabasa, A. (2012), loc. cit. 
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“reforming terrorist sympathizers and supporters, not hard-core militants. This has 
become increasingly apparent in light of the number of Saudi Guantanamo detainees 
who have returned to terrorism upon their release.”60 
This method obviously distorts the perceived potential impact of de-radicalization, but it 
poses some tough questions: does this esteemed de-radicalization model (that has shaped the 
formation of others) deem some individuals as unable to be ‘brought back from the brink’? Is 
the process deemed only to work on those who haven’t committed actual violence? 
Programmes that intervene in the purely pre-criminal space also suffer from the inherent 
problem of measuring recidivism. How is the level of threat they were deemed to pose 
effectively measured against the new, lowered risk, and at what point do they return to posing 
a threat and are said to have experienced or committed ‘recidivism’? This is surely an 
overwhelmingly subjective - and therefore poor - metric for understanding perceived risks 
against the state. 
As well as the problem of de-radicalization schemes often focussing on pre- and low-
level criminals, the case of Northern Ireland demonstrates how figures can also not accurately 
represent the truth; the Independent Monitoring Commission reported only on murders that 
took place, none of which were carried out by groups involved in the political peace 
settlement that had disavowed violence. But a far higher number of non-fatal shootings and 
assaults took place in the country, and Horgan and Braddock suggest “it is likely that some 
shootings and assaults”61 were ultimately carried out by these groups. The murder rate in 
Belfast is consistently around 50% higher than that of London, and has seen the second 
highest rates only to Glasgow across the whole of the UK over time.62 The Saudi programme 
has been reported to challenge the validity of attacks in Saudi Arabia as it is not occupied by a 
foreign power and enjoys an Islamic government (de-radicalization), but simultaneously has 
                                                 
60 Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2010), op. cit., p. xvi 
61 Horgan, J., Braddock, K. (2010), loc. cit. 
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not discouraged ‘jihad’ outside the borders in occupied or apostate states.63 This tactic helps 
to reduce the domestic rates of recidivism and obviously helps to bolster security, but de-
radicalization (and disengagement) is not truthfully being achieved.64 Pakistan has faced 
similar criticism; violent extremists are dissuaded from attacking Pakistanis, but of Indians are 
told “it’s not wrong to want to kill these infidels or apostates.”65 Taking recidivism figures at 
face-value is therefore short-sighted and inadvisable; as a metric these statistics may not be a 
useful representation of the effectiveness of de-radicalization programmes, given the diverse 
variables involved. 
Moreover, relying on recidivism rates of subjects to demonstrate relative successes 
implies that the de-radicalization (and disengagement) programmes in question are a variable 
and therefore the - or at least a - cause of the avoidance of further violence. In Australia, the 
prisoners once released are subjected to constant surveillance, and the risks involved in re-
engaging in criminal activity are therefore very high.66 Evaluating the impact of their 
ideological reformation is consequentially very challenging. Though Neumann suggests that 
the best programmes take a comprehensive approach, incorporating both ideological and 
rehabilitative practices,67 Rabasa emphasizes that ideology remains the “glue that holds [the 
groups] together [and] provides an explanation for the grievances”,68 a position assumed by 
governments that has driven a perceived need for ideologically-based counter- and de-
radicalization initiatives. However, demonstrating actual causality rather than merely 
explanations of the acquisition or possession of a radical ideology on the engagement in 
terrorism appears futile. As most programmes consist of both psychological and practical 
                                                 
63 Rabasa, A. (2012), loc. cit. 
64 Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2010), op. cit., p. xvi 
65 Shahin, S. (2015), De-radicalization: Sharing Best Practices - ICT15, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=426pLAaFjco&t=373s, YouTube, hosted by International Institution for 
Counter-terrorism (CT), published 20/12/15, accessed 23/06/17 
66 El Said, H. (2015), op. cit., p. 92 
67 Neumann, P. (2010), Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalization and De-radicalization in 15 Countries, 
http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/1277699166PrisonsandTerrorismRadicalisationandDe-
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published 2010, accessed 15/06/17, p. 47 
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aspects, it remains onerous to determine “which part of these efforts produces moderation.”69 
The Yemeni approach, which was almost entirely focussed on countering prisoners’ 
ideology,70 was not renowned for its low recidivism; Mustafa Alani, the Gulf Research 
Centre’s then Director of Security, noted that the programme suffered from 70% recidivism 
(those being arrested for terrorism-related offences).71 Ferguson elucidates the difficultly of 
using recidivism rates to demonstrate the effectiveness of such programmes: “What would be 
a successful recidivism rate for terrorists, and how would we know the program created this 
low rate of recidivism?”72 Until these questions have been answered, evaluating their value 
will remain as speculation, rather than science. 
Though recidivism has been taken as a default metric of success of de-radicalization 
(at least by its practitioners), in an area so beset by opacity some consider it appropriate to 
challenge what success could even mean.73 After all, how could what is essentially deemed a 
psychological process be measured in practical results? How can those who have only 
supported - rather than engaged in - radical violence be deemed successfully de-radicalized by 
not engaging in an activity they were never engaged in? Koehler himself notes that “the de-
radicalization field globally is more or less completely free of any working standards”.74 
Evaluative methods have been suggested by various academics and the discussion is slowly 
but surely moving forwards.75 Those like Koehler are driving a conceptual approach, such as 
in Structural Quality Standards for Work to Intervene with and Counter Violent Extremism, 
where he urged minimum working standards in the field to allow for greater consistency in 
                                                 
69 Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2010), op. cit., p. 184 
70 Neumann, P. (2010), op. cit., p. 51 
71 Gardner, F. (2008), Saudi Jails Aim to Tackle Terror, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7220797.stm, BBC, published 31/01/08, accessed 22/06/17 
72 Ferguson, N. (2016), loc cit. 
73 Horgan, J., Braddock, K. (2010), loc. cit. 
74 Koehler, D., in Koerner, B. (2017), A Controversial New Programme Aims to Reform Homegrown ISIS 
Recruits back into Normal Young Americans, https://www.wired.com/2017/01/can-you-turn-terrorist-back-into-
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evaluation.76 Alongside this standards-driven movement, in-depth, case-based evaluations are 
also taking place: Michael Williams, John Horgan and William Evans examined a single US-
based programme that, whilst accepting its limitations in terms of scale and measuring the 
causality of different variables, showed that a flexible and localized approach to measuring 
the countering of violent extremism could prove valuable.77 In what Horgan and Braddock 
considered a viable method by which to analyse risk-reduction programmes, the 
Multiattribute Utility Technology,78 its authors Edwards and Newman proposed that such 
programmes should be evaluated using actual data, and the building of similar new 
programmes should be informed by statistics.79 Likewise, Williams and Kleinman have 
developed a ‘roadmap’ by which schemes can be evaluated, including a greater role for 
stakeholders to determine the meaning and validity of a programme’s success.80 However, 
serious issues around the evaluation of programmes still exist. Who measures a programme’s 
success is also a matter of debate; Szmania and Mastreo remarked that a Yemeni judge 
oversaw the evaluation of a programme, but that a “psychologist, a teacher, or a family 
member”81 could determine success very differently. Furthermore, if statistics and practices 
are country- and even programme-specific, based on how they each calculate their successes 
differently, it remains problematic to attempt to encourage coherent practice with highly 
disparate contexts. Compared to far more mechanical disengagement efforts to rehabilitate 
former militants on both an individual and collective level, such as FARC or AUC militants in 
Colombia82 where the metrics of success are more clearly gauged (the laying down of arms, 
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for example), the chronic shortage of evaluative processes in de-radicalization schemes - let 
alone consideration of what could constitute consistent evaluation methods83 - only highlights 
the distance to go regarding the practice of de-radicalization. Though Koehler’s landmark 
2017 volume Understanding De-radicalization systematized knowledge on existing counter- 
and de-radicalization schemes, it highlighted the diverse approaches to challenging ideologies 
in the various countries.84 It is often unclear why those deemed de-radicalized have been 
released from prison in different regions, and programmes suffer from a lack of evaluative 
processes by which they could offer their justifications or be judged.85 Abuza writes that in 
some ‘de-radicalization programmes’, there is in fact no evidence indicating the released 
prisoners encountered any de-radicalizing processes whatsoever.86 A core element of policy 
making is that “policy makers clearly define the outcomes the policy is designed to 
achieve,”87 but Horgan and Braddock conclude that it is “practically impossible to ascertain 
what is implied by or expected from programs that claim to be able to de-radicalize 
terrorists.”88 In France, a cottage industry has arisen of activists and non-experts who 
successfully apply for portions of the abundant funding to practise counter- and de-
radicalization; this scenario has been encouraged by the lack of standards and evaluation of 
such practice.89 France24 reported that amongst a “basket of hustlers”90 one activist had 
personally acquired €60,000 out of government de-radicalization grants, and who had been 
involved in over a dozen cases of fraud and scamming. The country’s approach has been 
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described as a “total fiasco”91 as the only one of the twelve planned de-radicalization centres 
has been closed down due to lack of demand. Offering space for 25 individuals, it only ever 
welcomed 9 and none of those ever completed the programme.92 Similarly, in Australia, it has 
been reported that an industry emerged almost overnight, proliferated by previously unknown 
groups and individuals with little research track record or access to radicalized youths.”93 
Expert in extremism at Edith Cowan University Anne Aly notes that the Australian CVE field 
"has become an enterprise… It's cut throat."94 Programmes have been found largely to be self-
evaluated, and like France, possessing little - if any - governmental oversight, with no 
standardized working practices or methods of evaluation.95 With the development of the field 
still taking place and only the very beginnings of working standards starting to form, it is 
crucial that a field relatively saturated by non-expert practitioners should be driven by the 
principles outlined in the works mentioned above. Otherwise misallocation of resources, and 
practice-driven failure will continue. 
Whilst this learning progresses, we must ask whether the practice of combating 
ideological radicalization and its consequences be better understood so that policy more 
appropriately deals with threats to our societies. This article aims to accomplish exactly that - 
to move the debate forwards, and hopefully contribute to a better method of countering the 
risks of terrorism, taking into consideration an accurate level of threat it poses. Those 
currently attempting to combat radicalization, in a time where understanding of the causes of 
terrorism and the effects and success of anti-terror policies in their infancy, often promote the 
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concept that its value - though not truly understood - is greater than the risks of not ‘de-
radicalizing’ individuals.96 John Horgan alludes to this notion in the foreword to Koehler’s 
Understanding De-radicalization, commenting that 
“those who care about the extraordinary social and psychological toll associated with 
terrorism cannot sit idly by while academics and politicians pontificate on whether we 
are using appropriate definitions, language, and terminology.”97 
However, although the argument put forward by Horgan and others criticizing ivory-tower 
debate98 is persuasive, it could be seen to suggest that any attempt at finding a solution is 
valid and necessary, and that results are unimportant. In a field where respective successes or 
failures have been impossible to assess, it is incumbent upon academics to challenge policy 
makers and practitioners in order to improve policy, and move the debate forwards in search 
of better practice. Considering other alternatives encourages the development of better 
practice, and helps to understand the consequences for relevant groups within society. More 
information, where there exists largely only policy makers’ assumption and practitioners’ 
intuition,99 can only be a step in the right direction. Policy makers consistently call for an 
emphasis on evidence-based policy informed by previous practice and “robust evidence”.100 
More importantly, the hegemonic discourse (a society’s dominant narrative driven 
through speeches, policy and practice for instance) changes how policy in the future is 
approached. For instance, the discourse on terrorism before the 9/11 attacks, which 
highlighted its apocalyptic nature and indicated its existential threat,101 helped to enable the 
West to wage its ‘War on Terror’.102 If the narrative had existed where 9/11 was viewed as an 
anomaly rather than a harbinger of devastating terrorism, the wars in Afghanistan and later 
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Iraq may never have happened. Policy makers must be careful how they approach the causes 
of extremism and how extremists are treated following the cessation of their crimes, because 
as we allow these discourses (through practice) to become hegemonic, they affect how we 
approach policymaking in the future. Taking a practitioner-driven rather than an academic 
approach can contribute to current practices or perspectives not being challenged, and result 
in policy makers developing policy without understanding the potential consequences for 
society. 
 
Ideology as a Cause? 
As part of deducing how legitimate the aims of combating ideological radicalization 
are, we much challenge its internal justifications. It takes ideology as a central cause of 
terrorism, or the main risk factor in encouraging individuals to turn to violence to accomplish 
their goals. Whilst many prison-based programmes focus on social rehabilitation, they often 
also attempt to perform ideological transformation, and schemes aiming to prevent violence 
outside of prison settings also endeavour to counter their subjects’ ‘radical ideologies’, 
focussing emphatically on their beliefs and the frame through which they view the world. The 
National Consortium for Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, after undertaking 
quantitative research on better understanding terrorism and disengagement, found there was 
“no empirical support”103 upholding many ideologically-focussed approaches. However, are 
practices that target ideology justified in principle? How far does a radical ideology actually 
cause terrorism to a point where it becomes desirable to spend public money, time and effort 
countering it? 
The logic of de-radicalization rests upon the ability to reverse ‘psychological 
processes’ and violent ideologies, however, academics have seriously contested the ability of 
practitioners to reverse these processes. Horgan asks, “Can this actually be done in the ways 
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that such initiatives suggest? The answer to this is, very simply, no.”104 Furthermore, the 
argument that “ideas do not necessarily lead to violence”105 has been championed by Horgan 
and Bjørgo as the preeminent scholars in the field. They challenge the perception of any 
causal link between ideology and radical violence, rejecting the assumption that individuals 
can be effectively dissuaded from partaking in terrorism by reversing some radical ideological 
stance.106 Instead, rather than a fundamentalist world view causing engagement in violence, 
they suggest that a fundamentalist ideology is acquired only following the individual’s 
incorporation with a group.107 Although there are cases where leaders who have quit their 
respective movements attempt to ‘de-radicalize’ their former comrades by denouncing 
terrorism as a method by which to attain their goals,108 it does not necessarily follow that de-
radicalization and disengagement from violence are causally associated; an individual can 
abandon violence without relinquishing their extreme perspectives.109 Indeed, Atran suggests 
that “people don’t simply kill and die for a cause. They kill and die for each other.”110 
Evidence supports the position of these scholars; where groups have participated in collective 
disengagement, some fighters retain their allegiance to the aspirations of the group whilst it 
was actively in combat; exploring Colombian insurgent groups, the Human Rights Watch 
notes that “while [former fighters] may be disengaged, they are not necessarily ‘de-
radicalized’.”111 Horgan emphasizes that in all of his interviews from 2006-2008, whilst the 
vast majority were physically disengaged, none of them was actually truly de-radicalized; 
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each had retained the views they had possessed whilst being active in their respective 
groups.112 Studying Northern Irish former combatants, Ferguson found that despite whilst 
they now denounced violence and worked with counter-radicalization programmes, many 
subjects “had actually become more radical through their time in the organization or 
especially whilst in prison rather than less”.113 This finding suggests that to attempt to ‘de-
radicalize’ these individuals would not necessarily be productive and could even be 
counterproductive; if they were to become less passionate or ‘ideological’, it could result in 
them losing interest in preventing further violence and working towards more political 
solutions. Is encouraging such militants to consider alternatives to violence whilst they 
become more passionately ideological still an act of de-radicalization? If so, the aim of 
ideologically-de-radicalizing an individual becomes even more questionable. Afghanistan has 
developed its own disengagement programme, which sees incoming Taliban fighters as 
having “little ideological baggage”.114 The Indonesian ‘de-radicalization’ programme 
reportedly subjects its participants to minimal ideological assessment,115 and those that 
disavow violence are said to base their renunciations on financial incentives and early-release 
rather than actually believing that terrorism is not legitimate. Money and personal freedom, it 
appears, plays more of a role in disengagement than the inmates’ religious ideologies that 
justify the radical violence.116 One study of individuals who were recommended to be 
researched by the authorities (including the police) for their exemplary behavioural 
transformation from terrorism to disengagement and for promoting an anti-violence message, 
found that these individuals were fervently critical of the Indonesian de-radicalization 
scheme. One participant who had passed through the programme said that “de-radicalization 
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is good if it is successful in performing social re-integration”117 - a perspective that 
misunderstands the academic definition of de-radicalization but that ultimately rejects the 
importance of ideology in causing terrorism, or the importance of a de-radicalized ideology 
on recidivism rates. All of these examples show that attempting to change a former violent 
extremist’s ideological stance may not be the most appropriate method to reduce recidivism; 
in some cases retaining a radical ideology even encourages the abstinence from violence and a 
move towards political solutions. 
De-radicalization is often confused for mechanical disengagement,118 resulting in 
many rehabilitative programmes being labelled ‘de-radicalization’ initiatives. However, they 
often do engage in religious discussions, or touch on issues that could be considered 
ideological. However, Porges and Stern note that this occurs to cultivate an environment 
where behavioural reform could be effected; exploration of an individual’s ideology is 
therefore sometimes only a vehicle to more mechanical disengagement.119 It can therefore be 
argued that the priority of schemes that look after imprisoned former combatants is to ensure a 
smooth transition back into their families and communities, through their practical training 
and education.120 
 
Shaping Discourse  
 
This section pertains largely to those programmes that are considered to practice de-
radicalization, though are more scientifically defined as counter-radicalization; they are 
preventative, risk-minimizing schemes that step in and prevent crimes from taking place. 
Being one of the most internationally recognized and approaches in countering violent 
extremism and whose ideas have been exported across the globe,121 the British model 
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(operating in the “pre-crime”122 space) has placed a discriminate focus on individuals 
espousing significantly critical perspectives. When such programmes operate preventatively, 
because of limited resources they will necessarily discriminate, prioritizing the targeting of 
individuals who possess characteristics that correlate with people who have committed 
terrorist attacks in the past. In Britain this has tended to be Muslims; since the 7/7 bombings 
committed by individuals confessing an allegiance with the Islamic faith, Muslims have been 
the priority target for British anti-terror efforts, under which the practice of counter- and de-
radicalization falls. The following discussion, taking the British model as the principal case 
study, makes three distinct arguments: firstly that such practices silence legitimate grievances 
from being discussed within societies; secondly that this vacuum of silence allows states to 
promote their preferred version of religion and ideology; and thirdly that the perceptions over 
de-radicalization programmes encourage an Othering of groups within society who share 
characteristics of those being ‘de-radicalized’. 
 
Silences Discussion 
Where preventative programmes exist to step in before a ‘radical ideology’ develops 
into physical terrorism, they encourage - and even necessitate - the profiling of individuals 
based on their correlations with previous (and high-profile) attacks. The most potent example 
is Channel, the intervention arm of the UK’s Prevent programme that attempts to minimize 
the threat of violent extremism. Since 2015, those in UK public institutions are required to 
refer those they suspect of harbouring extremist views to the Channel programme, at which 
point officials then step in and walk through the individual’s ideology with them.123 At the 
same time, criminal charges are now being brought for far lower-level threats, and the 
entrapment overwhelmingly of Muslims has become standard practice. Those deemed 
vulnerable or capable of engaging in terrorism are duped “into committing crimes that would 
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never have occurred [without the authorities’] inducement”.124 Kundnani talks about the 
Demographics Unit established in America, where undercover officers and informants are 
paid to visit what are essentially thought to be ‘high-vulnerability’ locations - largely mosques 
- and listen out for “hostility to the US”.125 In 2008, the FBI had at least 15,000 informants on 
their books.126 This phenomenon is no secret; Muslim organizations and mosques are well 
aware that their conversations may be being recorded and reported.127 
This profiling that results from authorities targeting certain people-groups to assist 
either their preventative counter-radicalization (in the UK) or their arrest (in the US), has the 
effect of silencing the profiled targets. The Muslim Council of Britain points out that children 
have been deemed to be threats and referred for preventative ideological ‘de-radicalization’ 
for a range of absurd reasons, including the possession of a ‘boycott Israel’ leaflet and ‘Free 
Palestine’ badges.128 Since the attacks of 9/11 and the consequential development of 
preventative programmes, mosques have been pressurized to expel those demonstrating 
radical views (even about their opposition to Western foreign policy), rather than to 
encourage discussion and debate, meaning that in public settings, radical views are rarely 
aired.129 Though the UK Government has expressed its desire for controversial topics to be 
debated in classrooms,130 it is also mandatory for teachers to refer children for ‘de-
radicalization’ for bringing up their “concern about British policy in the Middle East”131 as a 
potential sign of radicalization. How does thought-provoking debate take place where the 
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terms of engagement are so restricted? Teaching unions have opposed the legal duty to report 
their students, claiming that such an approach “encourages lecturers to spy on their students 
and will inhibit academic discussion.”132 If preventative de-radicalization is accelerated and 
more definitively enforced, which seems to be accelerating - the UK is developing a 
mandatory rather than purely voluntary scheme, and US President Trump has indicated that 
its preventative focus will confront solely ‘Islamist extremism’ - then this trend is only likely 
to continue. 
This emphasis on counter-radicalization validates the perception that radicalism itself 
is dangerous, and suppresses the communication of radical thoughts and ideas in our societies. 
The Saudi Religious Subcommittee, a part of the Saudi approach to de-radicalization, is 
comprised of state-approved individuals (clerics, university scholars, religious experts) who 
discuss with detainees their interpretations of religious texts “with the goal of persuading 
them to adopt a more moderate ideology”;133 in effect seeking to suppress radicalism. 
Individuals and groups who have historically been perceived as radicals, like the suffragist 
movement or those campaigning for civil rights in the US, have ensured a more equal 
society.134 If we quash the ability even to hold radical views, there is a danger we quash 
opportunities for social and systemic reform. Had the practice of preventative de-
radicalization existed when the Suffragette movement in the UK was active, it is not 
inconceivable that they may have been subjected to such programmes. Where preventative 
measures are becoming mandatory (as in the UK, which has typically exported its 
counterradicalization policies abroad), parallels can be drawn between current programmes 
and the process of silencing of the political objectives of Italian left-wing militants following 
their defeat and imprisonment in the 1970s. Heath-Kelly, in studying the political violence of 
the ‘Years of Lead’ in Italy, explores the rewards such as early release or employment 
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presented to militants who denounce violence, writing that “the significance of renunciation 
seems to relate to the reintegration of the militant into the reach of the administration.”135 She 
found that whilst in prison, those who had been involved in killing, maiming and bombing 
during the political turmoil in Italy had organically organized discussion and decided to 
abandon armed struggle. Following their shift in perspective, the state viewed these very same 
individuals completely differently; despite still having the exact same history, the sentences of 
‘the disassociated’ as they became known were ended and they were released.136 This appears 
to be a similar technique deployed under contemporary programmes that combat 
radicalization: radical stances that challenge the state’s power are solved by the state by re-
imposing its hegemony through paternalistic targeting of imprisoned subjects’ personal values 
and political outlook, and rewarding them when ‘divergents’ align themselves with the state’s 
view of what is acceptable to believe. The Italian state, in forgiving its opponents who had (at 
least outwardly) realigned with its own values was employing this pastoral power to bolster 
its legitimacy and curtail criticism. In a similar way, current de-radicalization efforts 
encourage citizens to retain mainstream, non-radical mindsets that don’t challenge its 
hegemony. They are undertaken to ensure the continuance of the dominant narrative that the 
state ‘knows best’, and that violent extremism is only ever destructive and has no aims. Where 
radical mindsets are found (in violent and non-violent individuals), they are subjected to a 
discourse that states that the acceptance of the “authority of any elected Government in this 
country”137 is mandatory and any rejection of which is a sign of radicalization. This could 
become a dangerous precedent; if genuine discrimination is occurring - as happened against 
women in previous times - and some turn to violence as a result, rather than addressing the 
actual issues, governments may rely more on de-radicalization than debate within society to 
fix the problem. 
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This comparison highlights that combating perceived radicalization allows a state to impose 
its dominance by spreading its version of acceptability, and especially in prison programmes 
to enforce a state-sanctioned version of religion on the participants. Officials from the 
Victorian prison scheme noted that they had “two other imams and we had to let them go too 
because they were not doing and saying the right things. We are now looking for new 
imams.”138  Saudi Arabia has developed a counter-radicalization approach whereby its 
Ministry of Culture and Information “sends religious experts to schools and mosques to 
preach the dangers of radicalism.”139 The power of the state is concisely described by 
Braddock as he discusses the options put before individuals caught for terrorist offences: 
They may either take part in a rehabilitation process and renounce their loyalty to the 
terrorist movement of which they are a part, or they can face prosecution for terrorist-
related offences and be sent to a Saudi prison. If the individual chooses to undergo 
rehabilitation, Saudi officials ask participants what they did and why they did it… 
Members of the Advisory Committee respond by showing how participants’ 
interpretations of Islam are incorrect, and offer a more moderate interpretation of the 
Qur’an upon which the remainder of the rehabilitation programme is based.140 
So they can either choose to lose their freedom for years for the crimes they committed, or 
accept the Saudi Arabian government’s interpretation of the Qur’an, much like the case in 
Italy. Governments in Muslim-majority countries, or where Islam is the official religion, are 
often willing to involve themselves in promoting the country’s official doctrine, or a doctrine 
that doesn’t harm its interests. This can lead to previously mentioned complications whereby 
the prisoners are ordered not to attack their own Islamic societies, but attacking others is not 
necessarily wrong. Where countries adopt counter-radicalization schemes, they approach 
interlocutors - organizations who could appeal to the profiled groups - to convey their desired 
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message that emphasizes unity, shared resilience and values supporting the maintenance of 
the status quo.141 In these countries - often being liberal democracies - it should be regular 
practice to stimulate rather than curtail debate. A healthy, functioning liberal society should 
be able to critically challenge differences in perspective rather than attempt psychological 
reform on those who don’t conform to the hegemonic patterns of thought. But such a trend 
has not been set by the UK Government; it shunned the organization that could most 
emphatically claim to represent Muslims,142 the Salafi-controlled Muslim Council of Britain 
(MCB), and was “said to have more credibility on the street.”143 The MCB saw its previously 
held favour and funding with the UK Government lost, largely over its vociferous opposition 
to the Iraq War, and was replaced by the much less critical Quilliam Foundation and the Sufi 
Muslim Council (SMC).144 This episode showed that differences of opinion were more 
important than collaboration. Kundnani writes that it also is an “unstable”145 practice, setting 
one group or set of beliefs as state-approved and another as state-disapproved puts “moderate 
Muslims in the precarious position of continually being scrutinized for evidence that they 
really have distanced themselves from [the state-disapproved set of beliefs].”146 So promoting 
the practice of de-radicalization logically brings a state-sanctioned version of religious beliefs, 
with the consequence of securitizing certain groups who don’t necessarily conform to a state’s 
(changing) definition of acceptable beliefs. 
 
Othering 
Othering divergent and critical perspectives is said to be a negative side-effect of 
programmes that seek to counter and de-radicalize citizens.147 The pre-emptive silencing of 
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criticism by minority groups or people on the fringes of society with legitimate grievances148 
can occur through the practice of combating radicalization; radical perspectives are gradually 
sidelined with a consequence of legitimizing their perception that the state and society are set 
against them, compounding the ‘us versus them’ perspective. Edwards notes that 
Labelling certain political ideologies as illegitimate; as unacceptably extreme, or as 
inherently violent; will inevitably lead some believers of those ideologies to adopt 
illegitimate means of expressing those ideologies and pursuing their goals, including 
illegal and violent means. Isolating and condemning holders of views seen as 
unacceptably extreme is likely to lead to the stigmatisation of individuals, with direct 
personal and social costs.149 
Whilst de-radicalization programmes existed in Europe first to help rehabilitate right-wing 
extremists, many countries’ schemes, like those in France and the Netherlands, were 
developed in the wake of attacks perpetrated by Muslims.150 They therefore are frequently and 
overwhelmingly aimed at either preventing the spread of some fanatical Islamist ideology, or 
attempt in to de-radicalize Islamist extremists in prison. With European countries having 
faced decades of left- and right-wing, territorial and religious terrorism, a perception exists 
that terrorism perpetrated by Muslims is being treated radically differently given the often 
discriminatory practices that combat radicalization.151 EIS, an education trade union in 
Scotland (which therefore has a duty to refer suspected students for preventative de-
radicalization), says that “The Prevent Strategy equates ‘extremism’ almost completely with 
Islam, this will encourage Islamophobia and racism on campuses.”152 Australian counter-
radicalization practices almost entirely aimed at Muslim ‘communities’ have contributed to 
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the perception that they are set apart from the rest of Australian society, and increasing levels 
of distrust between Muslim minorities and the authorities in the country have been 
reported.153 The effect has been a stigmatizing one154 that is reputedly encouraging some 
young Muslims to engage in radical violence.155 
Whilst anti-terror policies do not themselves create these discourses of Muslims or as 
the Other (it being a millennium-old narrative),156 targeting specific groups through counter-
radicalization corroborates the meaning and strength of such divisive narratives within 
societies. Directing ‘cohesion funding’ at areas of high Muslim populations as though they 
were a separate, definable and distinct group ensures that those perceived to be Muslims are 
thenceforth potential threats as a ‘suspect community’, to be blamed as one for future 
attacks.157 There are clearly regions of higher Muslim population, such as Luton in the UK 
(25%)158 or Molenbeek in Belgium (41%),159 that are targeted for recruitment by so-called 
Islamist terrorist groups. Whilst this is clearly a concerning state of affairs, targeting these 
areas through counter- and de-radicalization as a policy with no scientific track record and 
claims of counter-productiveness may only enhance the perceived chasm and distrust between 
people groups. Requiring that civil society (nurses, teachers and social workers) be 
consciously alert to terrorist threats only ensures the unabated continuance of the narrative; 
70% of referrals to counter-radicalization programme Channel are Muslims.160 The 
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relationship “between the state and some of its ethnic minorities, is characterized by distrust 
and suspicion [based on the] unequal approach to violence emanating from their communities 
compared to others.”161 It is widely reported to encourage a ‘them and us’ pattern of 
thought,162 ironically the very ideology the Government wants to defeat.163 The scheme is 
perceived to be so harmful - called an “Islamophobic, toxic policy that claims to be working 
towards de-radicalization but is targeting the community and de-Islamising Islam”164 - that the 
MCB is reported to be starting its own ‘preventative de-radicalization’ programme in 2017.165 
Other countries report similar patterns; El Said comments that US policies countering 
terrorism are “among the most frequently cited ‘grievances’ of Muslim Americans”.166 From 
9/11 until the Orlando nightclub shooting,167 there were more deaths from other forms of 
extremism than so-called Islamist attacks, but the US looks likely to move towards a system 
where all community-based counter-radicalization efforts are aimed solely at Muslims.168 
Whilst Muslims have felt ‘Othered’, numerous programmes are also aimed primarily 
at non-Muslims such as the EXIT strategy employed in several European states, or Crossroads 
in Germany. Although a proportion of these programmes do focus on the behaviour and social 
integration of subjects, many concentrate on the subjects’ (extreme right-wing) ideologies.169 
These individuals may have legitimate grievances - such as concern about the scale or make-
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up of immigration - but are set against mainstream society through counter- and de-
radicalization practices. In sum, programmes that target ideology designate subjects’ views as 
unacceptable and illegitimate, and cause those who harbour such perspectives to be seen (and 
to see themselves) as separate from the rest of society. With the practice of combating 
radicalization being gradually extended, will this expansion of state capacity - like the British 
attempt - entrench divisions in societies further and even cause some to turn towards radical 
violence? 
 
Individualizing Causes 
The practice of performing ideological transformation is based on the theory of 
radicalization, which takes the individual as the highest unit of concern, and the cause of 
violent extremism. The narrative has individualized the debate to a point where discussion 
around government policy as causal (most notably foreign affairs) is often derided as 
unpatriotic and those raising the issue are roundly condemned.170 This silencing of the idea 
that politics could cause terrorism has occurred gradually: academic debate through the turn 
of the millennium shifted from macro analysis down onto the individual, examining in 
particular their personal psychology. Theories of how individuals became ‘radicalized’ 
abounded171 as the defeat of left-wing terrorism, the end of the Cold War and a series of 
attacks from ‘home-grown’ extremists like the Oklahoma City bombing and the sarin gas 
attack in Japan, brought an end to the dominant discourse around the term ‘terrorism’ to mean 
‘state terrorism’ or a ‘state of warfare’, and its use developed instead for individuals and small 
groups of like-minded extremists.172 The beginning of the depoliticization of terrorism was 
borne of this era; US President Clinton claimed attacks like those mentioned were 
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“random”173 rather than being explicitly political. Over time, this idea has taken hold, and the 
role of ideology rather than political aims is seen to drive terrorism. Despite anecdotes that 
indicate foreign policy is a matter of huge concern to some and the cause of young Europeans 
travelling to fight for IS,174 and comprehensive academic studies which conclude 
overwhelmingly that challenging military interventions is a key priority for terrorists,175 
politicians consistently ridicule the idea that their decisions have a part to play.176 Schemes 
countering radicalization, in attempting ideological reform of individuals behind closed doors, 
embeds this perception that ideology rather than political aims cause terrorism. Mark 
Sedgwick eloquently states, 
The concept of radicalization emphasizes the individual and, to some extent, the 
ideology and the group, and significantly de-emphasizes the wider circumstances - the 
‘root causes’ that it became so difficult to talk about after 9/11, and that are still often 
not brought into analyses. So long as the circumstances that produce Islamist radicals’ 
declared grievances are not taken into account, it is inevitable that the Islamist radical 
will often appear as a ‘rebel without a cause’177 
The schemes in question, being based on the doctrine of radicalization and therefore re-
emphasizing the individual’s ideology, contributes to the silencing of the relationship between 
states’ policy choices and the causes of terrorism. There remain huge gaps in our knowledge 
of the causes of terrorism, and predicting such deviant behaviour remains an ill-fated venture. 
The root causes perspective (personal grievances, political instability, economic hardship) has 
little empirical backing, as does any claim regarding the causes of terrorism. However, de-
radicalization being based on an approach underpinned by an individual’s ideology and the 
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predictiveness of terrorism is equally scientifically-unsupported. If we continue to engage in 
de-radicalization, or at least framing it as de-radicalization, we will continue to believe 
terrorism can be predicted and that it is driven by radical ideology, and remain unable to 
consider rationally the level of threat we face. 
 
Risk 
It is incumbent upon policy makers to ensure that public policy (and therefore the use 
of public money) is based on rationality, and on a “realistic understanding of the facts”.178 
Governments have a responsibility to their constituents to ensure security is reasonably 
maximized, but that risks against them aren’t artificially magnified. The premise upon which 
counter-radicalization, epitomized by the British approach, is built is that the individuals pose 
a physical risk to society, however, the threat of terrorism has been consistently overstated, 
and the unproven role that ideology has in causing terrorism made central to countering the 
threat of terrorism, particularly from Muslims.179 Across Europe, there grew a perceived need 
to act to anticipate and prevent further Islamist attacks following 7/7 in London, and the 
murder of film producer van Gogh,180 and so began the perceived importance of counter-
radicalization in helping to prevent these threats. In developing its ideology-based 
programme, French Senator Esther Benbassa commented that “the government was in panic 
as a result of the [Charlie Hebdo] attacks. And it was the panic that guided [its] actions. 
Political time is short, we had to reassure the population [that something was being done].”181 
The narrative on the risk of terrorism has been consistently built by academia, and politicians 
through both their words and policies. Scholars in the 1990s, such as Walter Laqueur, 
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influenced the debate through their assertions in the context of Islamist extremism that 
“megaterrorism has not yet arrived” (author’s emphasis).182 Coupled with narratives like 
these, the 9/11 attack - which was emphasized as a harbinger rather than an outlier183 - 
emphasized the perceived “existential”184 threat, and predictive profiling and surveillance of 
‘those who fit the bill’ was promoted as a rational and pressing policy decision. Ever since, 
trillions of dollars has been spent across the world in preventing terrorism,185 an aspect of this 
being the focus on ideological de-radicalization, and the preventative securitization often of 
Muslims by teachers, social workers and peers - even for merely expressing disagreement to 
UK foreign policy.186 ‘De-radicalization’ has become so synonymous with Islam and Muslims 
that articles in the media about any form of extremism cannot help but maintain the 
association between de-radicalization and Islamist extremism.187 The Extreme Risk Guidance 
principles that underlie counterradicalization efforts produce unproven claims as to who is 
likely to engage in terrorism,188 but which have enabled authorities to “monitor and profile 
Muslim citizens for the signs of radicalization and then intervene to prevent the drift to 
extremism”189 through de-radicalization practice. 
Though risk aversion is necessary to some degree in public policy, it should take a 
scientific approach, especially where it can impact negatively on citizens. Where certain 
                                                 
182 Laqueur, W. (2004), The Terrorism to Come, http://www.hoover.org/research/terrorism-come, Hoover 
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groups within society are targeted, overstating or understating risk can cost unnecessary 
money, expose citizens to preventable dangers, and cause discrimination to occur. The burden 
of proof should fall on the government to show its policies are based on evidence190 and are 
not causing ‘market failure’ - otherwise an inefficient allocation of resources - within risk 
management. It must be shown as prudent for three- and four-year-olds to be ‘de-radicalized’ 
as well as all other cases; should the burden of proof remain with the intuition of non-experts, 
policy implementation will remain prejudicial. 9-year-old British schoolboy ‘Haroon’ was 
required to undergo ‘de-radicalization’ with a Prevent officer because he had watched IS 
videos and pronounced his sympathy with the group whilst at school. It appeared there were 
others who were also watching similar videos, and he felt it was “unfair [that] other people 
got away with it”.191 As a result of his watching the graphic videos - in which he was not 
alone among his peers - and the declaration of sympathy - which could have resulted from 
him being bullied - the state stepped in to ‘de-radicalize’ this 9-year-old child over the course 
of a year. How and why do governments determine first of all the boundaries of an individual 
being a ‘risk’ (how much of a threat did this child pose?), at what point do individuals cross 
that line (why were his peers not similarly ‘de-radicalized’?), and after such a process, what is 
the point at which they do not pose a threat (how is it determined that this child no longer 
poses the previously perceived threat)? These questions must be answered by governments in 
their risk-management strategies, rather than leave non-experts in terrorism risk-management 
(teachers, social workers and nurses) to assume that responsibility. Similarly, Umm Ahmed, a 
British Muslim, was jailed for 12 months for the possession of Inspire Magazine which she 
had obtained to keep updated with her brother’s trial. In sentencing her the judge said that 
Umm posed no threat, that she had no intent to harm, that she was not a terrorist - and even 
that she was a good Muslim - but that he had to imprison her based on her possession of the 
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magazine.192 The MCB writes that “80% of Channel referrals between 2006 and 2013 were 
rejected by Channel panels, demonstrating that children are being viewed through the lens of 
security and practitioners are finding threats where none exist in many cases”.193 French 
sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar said that to add value to a society, programmes should admit 
only those who would actually pose some threat, such as returned foreign fighters or people 
who could be convicted of incitement to violence, rather than children who have divergent 
views but clearly do not pose a risk, for example.194 The distortion of risk in the field of 
preventing terrorism, only heightened by the exercise of referring thousands of schoolchildren 
for de-radicalization, has produced discrimination by civil society and the securitization of 
young children. Aside from it being hard to conceive that these minors would actually pose a 
threat and carry out destructive terrorism, statistically all of them are highly unlikely to 
engage in violence themselves. The West spends trillions on domestic (let alone foreign) 
counter-terrorism efforts taking this scientifically unproven and highly presumptuous 
ideology-based explanation and to minimize the threat from their constructed suspect 
communities; a frightening consequence of this drive is that particularly within the US, in 
borrowing predictive principles from the widely-criticized British Prevent Strategy, there has 
developed a network of 15,000 informants to target Muslims (in “Stazi-scale”195 surveillance), 
and the practice of entrapment has burgeoned. Aside from moving towards an oppressive and 
discriminatory surveillance state in which Muslims feel they cannot criticize their 
government’s policies without personal risk of being informed upon, the FBI has actually 
killed Americans on American soil based on opportunities the agency itself has provided to 
‘vulnerable’ Muslims. Judges have recurrently noted that these entrapped individuals would 
                                                 
192 Qureshi, A. (2015), Exclusive Interview with Umm Ahmed: The True Face of Counter-terrorism, 
https://cage.ngo/article/exclusive-interview-umm-ahmed-true-face-counter-terrorism/, Cage, published 27/01/15, 
accessed 24/06/17 
193 Muslim Council of Britain (2015), Meeting Between David Anderson QC and the MCB, 
https://www.mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/20150803-Case-studies-about-Prevent.pdf, Muslim 
Council of Britain, published 2015, accessed 28/06/17 
194 Khosrokhavar, F., in Marmouyet, F. (2017), France ‘Must Change Its Approach’ to De-radicalizing 
Islamists, http://www.france24.com/en/20170223-france-report-de-radicalisation-centre-approach-islamists-
jihad, France24, published 23/02/17, accessed 19/06/17 
195 Kundnani, A. (2014), loc. cit. 
  
 
 
 
 
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization 
 
 
 
 
39 
not otherwise have engaged in such deviant activities had the FBI not placed them in the 
‘wrong place’ at the ‘wrong time’. Judge McMahon, sentencing the Newburgh Four, said, 
“Only the government could have made a terrorist out of Mr Cromitie, a man whose 
buffoonery is positively Shakespearean in its scope… I believe beyond a shadow of a 
doubt that there would have been no crime here except [that] the government 
instigated it, planned it, and brought it to fruition.”196 
Seen as an integral part of preventing extremist violence is the practice of combating 
radicalization, the money spent on it must be justified in terms of violence prevented or lives 
saved. With currently spending levels preventing violent extremism many, many times greater 
than other potential hazards (like health and safety precautions, preventing car accidents),197 
we must vehemently challenge its existence, particularly considering that its underlying 
premises - of ideology creating risk and the ability to predict future terrorists - are highly 
disputable.198   
 
(Re)Framing the Debate 
 
Reframing the debate on how to deal with radicalness in our societies is crucial, and 
pressing. The expansion of programmes across the world will affect how millions of people 
experience society and their existence within a state. The consideration of the effects of 
counter-terrorism policy, over continuing blindly with a strategy that has no provable record 
and costing millions upon millions of dollars, must take place. Here, I explore possible 
alternative approaches to both the practice of and understandings behind schemes that ‘tackle 
radicalization’. 
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Prison-Based ‘De-radicalization’ 
Inside prisons where de-radicalization is said to be carried out - most notably in 
countries like Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, though others like France followed suit - there are 
actually few instances where prisoners’ ideological positions are systematically challenged. 
Where they have been challenged in the past, the countries are now gradually concentrating 
more on inmates’ economic and social rehabilitation.199 In such programmes that now 
overwhelmingly prioritize training the inmates and helping them develop skills for the job 
market, and ultimately where they place little emphasis on an ideology which seems to typify 
many current approaches,200 it may be helpful to frame these programmes as ‘post-crime 
rehabilitation’ schemes. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism suggests “risk reduction”201 as an effective alternative. Other terms that 
deemphasize the causal relationship that ideology has with terrorism whilst highlighting the 
normalcy of the individuals concerned would be appropriate, to help ease their reintegration 
into society upon release. 
In schemes that incorporate religious discussion, it is often from a point of basic 
education; El Said writes that “evidence shows that most violent extremists have weak or no 
rigorous religious knowledge.”202 Corroborating this, a study by Tahiri and Grossman found 
that “education was identified by all participants as the most critical element in reducing the 
appeal of violent extremism.”203 If this is the case, portraying the schemes as educative rather 
than de-radicalizing could be helpful, by reducing the emotive element of the definition. It 
would help to illuminate that rather than being committed to (often fanatical Islamic) 
ideologies, that in fact they are merely under-informed or lacking in effective critical thought. 
This could be especially helpful in European or non-Muslim-majority countries where 
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Islamophobia has led to revenge terrorism against Muslims,204 to discredit the narrative that 
there is a causal association between Islam and terrorism.205 This concept was substantiated 
by Zora Sukabdi’s study; she found that “all participants [thought] that most religious terror 
activists find the term ‘de-radicalization’ irritating”206 for similar reasons, and for presenting 
the idea that Islamic radicalness is only pejorative. French practitioner Marik Fetouh concurs. 
She commented that the term de-radicalization is negatively understood, that it implied 
oppression rather than the development of critical thought.207 It is clear that new definitions 
for prison-based practice, as an absolute minimum, are required. 
However, it is imperative to continue to challenge the actual principles behind de-
radicalization where it does occur, for their ability to shape narratives. Importantly, prison 
schemes have allowed governments to impose their own religiously acceptable views and 
control the discourse within the country. In some cases these programmes have appeared 
merely to function as legitimacy-builders for the government in question, with subjects 
required to declare their allegiance to the state following their completion of a de-
radicalization scheme whilst in prison.208 Without internationally-recognized and -upheld 
standards, these exercises will continue unabated. Criticism of existing practice therefore, 
including the underlying principles that drive such programmes and the state’s motivations is 
needed as countries expand their prison-based de-radicalization arsenal. 
Evaluation is a further element of such schemes in dire need of consideration. 
Attempts to assess de-radicalization programmes have failed miserably, with wild variance in 
who the schemes are dealing with, their concentration on psychology and ideology, and their 
very aims and objectives. Without the rigor of traditional forms of evaluation (after a 
complete reconsideration of what success could even look like), the practice will continue to 
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consume public money and time with no scientifically discernible success or failure rates. El 
Said’s comprehensive study shows that according to academic conceptions of ‘de-
radicalization’, many of the so-called de-radicalization programmes are little more than “a 
general improvement in prison management and environment”209 with their practice in use 
already elsewhere targeting gangs and drug addicts, but not considered to be de-radicalization. 
He points to the Shock Incarceration Treatment some inmates receive, which is similar in 
style to some so-called de-radicalization practices, the main different being its more coherent 
structure and evaluation.210 
 
Non-Prison-Based / Preventative Programmes 
Outside of the prison schemes, governments around the world are engaged in 
preventing terrorist attacks often through voluntary so-called de-radicalization programmes 
(in fact counter-radicalization) that attempt to reduce the perceived threat certain individuals 
pose. 
Practising the art of encouraging fighters returned from conflict zones like Syria, or 
terrorist attackers captured domestically, to think critically, educate them and discuss religion 
if appropriate, would be a justified approach, as they clearly have posed a physical threat and 
may still do. If they retain their violent perspectives and see no other alternatives (thereby 
rejecting Koehler’s notion of “re-pluralization”),211 they should remain locked up as they still 
pose a genuine risk to the rest of society. However, to treat individuals in the pre-crime space, 
before they have engaged in violent activism it is impossible to prove would have happened, 
only risks alienation between the state and these individuals, and others who empathize with 
those targeted and profiled by such policies. It has so far been overwhelmingly Muslims that 
have borne the brunt of preventative radicalization-based efforts, which only leads of a 
                                                 
209 El Said, H. (2015), op. cit., p. 255 
210 Ibid. 
211 Koehler, D. (2017), op. cit., pp. 80-3 
  
 
 
 
 
Tom Pettinger: De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization 
 
 
 
 
43 
vicious circle of stigmatization of Muslims, attacks on Muslims as a constructed suspect 
community, and further division: “terrorism begets terrorism”.212 
Without significant criticism and challenge, the development of further preventative 
efforts will accelerate; states are addicted to enhancing security until it becomes violated, at 
which point politicians reiterate the state’s resilience and securitize further.213 The premise of 
counter-radicalization is massively misjudged (in terms of risk and the unproven link between 
ideology and terrorism), and has significant consequences for society to a point where those 
being silenced are developing policies to compete with what they see as the state’s oppressive 
version.214 If the pattern of securitizing and discriminate profiling can be effectively 
challenged, our societies might begin to be able to have rational discussions about the causes 
of terrorism, and how best to combat it. 
However, ceteris paribus, renaming such programmes and practices could help to 
illuminate the disparity between the perceived risk posed by those subjected to ‘de-
radicalization’ and the actual level of threat. ‘De-radicalization’ as a definition also cements 
in public discourse the notion that ideology is the overriding cause of terrorism, rather than an 
associated factor that is also associated with non-violence. If the British programme Channel 
was called a ‘risk reduction’ programme, it would help to show teachers and others required 
to report those ‘vulnerable to radicalization’ that three- and four-year-old children should 
probably not be referred for posing a realistic terrorist threat, or at least implement a checklist 
system whereby the risk they pose should be graded. The policy Channel is derived from, 
Prevent, was previously called ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ but this was considered to 
have stigmatized Muslims, and so the government changed it.215 However, reviving such a 
title (or using the term “risk reduction”) and with it the associated consequences of perceived 
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discrimination would help to highlight where and how far racist practices are in fact taking 
place. Overturning the oppressive term ‘de-radicalization’ (by which it is often referred, 
despite being counter-radicalization) is critical, as it helps to construct suspect communities, 
definable by their skin colour or choice of clothing, and encourages a silencing of deviant and 
contrary perspectives which a democracy needs to be able to cope with. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
In sum, if there exist better ways to fail at public policy, these should be sought after 
rather than tinkering with an imperilled strategy that only entrenches unscientific attitudes and 
narratives behind the causes of radical violence. The practice of combating radicalization 
consolidates the perception that terrorism is caused by a fanatical religious ideology and that 
the holding of radical ideas within a society is only a detrimental attribute. Counter- and de-
radicalization have shown themselves to be an unreliable and divisive policy choice that 
shows no scientific basis for reducing risk against societies. Programmes that have asserted 
de-radicalization success have focussed on low-level or non-criminal individuals and have 
largely ignored the problems around their evaluation. Future expansion of de-radicalization 
programmes should be taken extremely seriously, on the basis of unfounded claims of 
success.216 As Foucault suggests, “Power exists only as exercised by some on others, only 
when it is put into action”217 - discourses and terminology have real world consequences, 
which affect individuals and society as a whole. When these are based on unscientific and 
politically-based assumptions, and the intuition of practitioners, rather than considered 
thought, it is easy to see how divisiveness and stigmatization in society becomes established, 
and a lack of foresight as to what such practice hopes to accomplish. This paper, therefore, 
recommends that: 
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• As a minimum, schemes that operate both as inside and outside of prisons are renamed 
away from the “unhelpful term”218 ‘de-radicalization’, to more accurately represent 
how they function. This will in turn help to disassociate the role of ideology in causing 
terrorism, which has been a significant cause of stigmatization for Muslims around the 
world. 
• “Post-crime rehabilitation schemes” is an appropriate alternative name for schemes 
based in prisons, and “risk-reduction schemes” where preventative policy exists 
outside of prisons. 
• The practice of securitizing alleged risks should be reformed to be driven more by 
science than presumption. Governments should legislate for what they consider to be 
threatening behaviour so the responsibility for risk-management doesn’t fall on the 
shoulders of non-terrorism experts. There should be requirements for referrals to be 
made based on evidence of risk rather than intuition and prejudice. 
• In the meantime, if practice based around countering ideology is to continue, debate 
should accelerate on what constitutes success. 
• Expanding programmes based on existing practice is at best flawed, and at worst, a 
stimulant for division and racism. 
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